

TOWARDS MULTINATIONAL COUNTRIES  
An Essay on Migration and Minorities

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We are today in a socio-political process that in a sense can be characterized as <sup>building</sup> nation-state in the reverse. The nation-state was and is a political program of compelling simplicity:

- (1) have the state organization of a country controlled by one nation
- (2) have the inhabitants of a country consist of only one nation
- (3) have all members of that nation live in the same country/territory

This may be seen as a progressive program: first, conquer the state; then purify the country [except for some marginal groups]; finally, gather the whole nation under that state. That the program is not without a socio-psychological, psycho-political basis is seen by its relative success in world history, based as it seems to be on a general human tendency to prefer one's own kind, as seen in patterns of homophily and homogamy - in the choice of friends and choice of spouses.

If the basic criterion for the definition of the nation is religious rather than linguistic, then the nation-state is usually referred to as theocratic; if it is race then as racist. Israel and South Africa are examples although for both of them only criterion number (1) above has been realized. Since the race criterion is relatively unchangeable racist regimes stand out as particularly objectionable; then come the theocratic ones because they imply an act of submission to a system of faith that although doable may not be acceptable to many. Least objectionable, it seems, is the definition in terms of language, and some mores, since it reduces to a question of learning rather than submitting. One may even learn the language of a host country without, so to speak, believing in it.

Since theocratic and racist regimes also tend to be beleaguered regimes they may try to bolster the countries by striving to achieve point (3) above - like Israel collecting Jews from all over the world, and South Africa whites from parts of Africa. As the exam-

ples indicate [3] may be implemented before or instead of [2]. But the crucial criterion is [1] - the control over the state, the center of power, the power over all other power relations inside the country.

Migration from one nation-state to another reduces [3] for the nation of origin, and [2] for the nation of arrival. Any migration of members of the dominant nation to another country, hence, is already a process of reversal for the nation-state program, and even doubly so. The rest is a question of [1], of control over the state, so that the state does not only favor its own nationals. And here the number of items, of rights and duties, contained in the notion of citizenship is very high, each one of them in principle something to be conquered, from the right of unlimited number of visits, residence, right to work, to benefit from social services, to vote, to hold office; and the duty to do military service and to raise one's children in the general ethos of that nation. Usually this is seen in terms of conquering rights rather than of accepting duties; one reason why citizens may feel discriminated when non-citizens are accorded more and more rights without necessarily assuming basic duties.

The strategies used by immigrants in conquering rights and by the local government (and citizens) in granting them/not granting them is not the subject here. This is a process filled with endless drama and variation as there is hardly any fixed order in which the rights can be conquered. What I am focussing on is a clarification of the possible goals of that process. This can be discussed in individual and in societal terms. From the point of view of the immigrant individual the goal may be a transitory stay or to stay on forever, including offspring; nomadic or sedentary, in other words. The nomads may go back to the point of origin or not; it is assumed that they have worked out in their own calculus of costs and benefits what serves them best. Obviously, it is limited how many nomads a

"modern" country can have within its borders. More interesting is the problem of <sup>social</sup> goal-states, at least visions of social goals, assuming a multi-national composition of the inhabitants (of whom the citizens are a sub-set) of the country.

First, there are those who have clearly vertical goal-models in mind, with a distinction between first and second class citizens - the latter may not even have citizenship. There is a de jure model with formal, explicit rules separating the ethnic groups or nations in what then becomes a caste system, and there is a de facto model based on informal, implicit mechanisms usually not separating the ethnic groups so perfectly, more like a correlation, like in a class system. The latter is what we are likely to have for a very long time, with slightly more upward than downward mobility for the non-dominant groups, but still **with** a clear correlation with power and privilege. This is hardly an explicit goal state.

Second, there are those who have clearly horizontal goal models in mind, without any distinction between first and second class citizens - regardless of ethnic origin they are all equally much citizens, with the same rights and duties at least in so far as ethnic origin is concerned. Again there are two broad classes of models: the singularist models whereby the inhabitants form one ethnic group only, and the pluralist models where there are several ethnic groups considered equal. Of the singularist models two are particularly well known as efforts to obtain integration into one ethnic group: the dominance model where the immigrants conform to the ethnic characteristics of the dominant group (which is not necessarily a majority group), and the melting-pot model whereby some kind of weighted average of ethnic characteristics is accepted as the national (new) norm, making each new immigrant and immigrant group in principle a contributor to the total mix, changing the point of gravity ever so little in one direction or the other. Although this term is often

used about the United States it is hard to see that this is justified. Linguistically English, or some kind of Basic English, is still the dominant language; there is little or nothing corresponding to a linguistic melting pot process as can be found in countries where some kind of pidgin is talked. Other languages are clearly second class languages. Religiously, however, one may perhaps talk about pluralism (although the ruling religion probably is the religion of the ruling class - that class is now changing from New England high church to California and South-West lower church traditions).

Of the pluralist models there are also two particularly known types: the "together and equal" and the "separate but equal" varieties. The differential use of conjunctives in the expressions, shifting from "and" to "but" point to the problem: is it possible to be "equal" (meaning "horizontal") if at the same time separate? The existence of an apartheid ("separate") which is certainly not equal, but rather a vertical caste system, does not prove anything: on the other hand there is the Swiss system with the cantons divided into three (four) linguistic and two religious groups, even highly correlated and yet as equal as it seems possible to become in a world very sensitive to ethnic characteristics.

The two models may be referred to as "integrated" and "federal", respectively. The integrated model is a vision of a country with different nations mixed together with a very high level of entropy, with no class order (that would make it vertical) and with no geographical order (which would make it, de facto, "federal"). I do not think we know any examples of this in the world today; race, not to mention ethnic characteristics seem to be so strong if not for socio-psychological at least for historical-political reasons that correlations with class and/or geography seem to arise. And if both of them become relatively high, stable, crystallized so to speak, then the basis for territorial separatism is present.

Although boring some words by way of definition are indispensable <sup>to proceed:</sup>

By a "racial group" I shall mean a group with some <sup>visible</sup> anatomical characteristics that are transmitted from one generation to the next bio-genetically, in common.

By an "ethnic group" I shall mean a group with some socio-cultural characteristics that are transmitted from one generation to the next socio-culturally, in common.

A racial group may or may not be an ethnic group; two groups may be ethnically different even if they are racially the same and vice versa - as is very well known. Moreover, depending on how many anatomical characteristics (color, physiognomy, hair etc.) or socio-cultural characteristics (language, religion, other social mores) we count we can arrive at any number of subdivisions. However, a basic criterion remains whether the characteristics are transmitted from one generation to the next when possessed by both parents, in other words whether they are bio-genetic, in the biological code or socio-genetic, in what one might call the sociological code.

The only important point in this definition is the role of the family. It is through the family, as a couple to start with, that another code is implanted into a society with a different dominant code. There is something transitory about a mono-sexual immigration of a different group, not only because their impact will only last as long as they are socially present, there is no progeny that can keep the code alive; but also because the problem of miscegenation, of mixed codes due to mixed marriage, does not arise. I shall return to this, let it only be noted that to some the threat of racial/ethnic conflict probably lies more in the threat to identity through code-mixing than in the threat of conflict between groups with distinct codes.

Finally, to stress the significance of the concept, one should only be reminded that the most important ethnic groups in the world today are called nations, basic units in the entire world construction. They may or may not be racially homogeneous.

Thus, having defined race and ethnicity, let us then move on to conflict. Why should there be any conflict at all? It is not at all obvious what the answer to this question is, but it has to be taken seriously. A conflict is something that obtains when (at least) two parties are pursuing incompatible goals. The parties in question are ethnic groups, leaving race aside. Ethnic groups, in the last instance ethnic individuals, certainly pursue social goals: goods and services, including power to dispense goods and services, possibly subsumable under the heading "social position". And then we are fairly close to class. (I will define as a social class those groups that have roughly the same level of power, or lack of power, over the distribution of goods and services produced in the society. In general they will use that power also to serve themselves (well), so as a general rule it can be assumed that the more power, the better the goods and services, from school to sanitation, from means of production to means of consumption. Consequently class is a question of the distribution of power and privilege.

Ethnic conflict, then, is located at the interface between two of the five strongest integrative foci of humankind: nation, class -- the three others being the biologically defined dimensions race, gender and age (with birth order as a special case). However, it is not yet obvious that any conflict has to derive from the circumstance that there are ethnically different actions present in the same country. The goals pursued have to be incompatible (or at least believed to be incompatible) for a conflict to arise, and even then only if the goals are really pursued. For some reason or another the ethnic groups may be allocated to different niches in the social structure. If these niches are not only mutually exclusive but also exhaustive and interactive in the sense that together they constitute a society problems might only arise if the demographic balances no longer work as they should: for instance, there is overflow from an overpopulated to an underpopulated niche. Even if one ethnic group occupies niches with lower class value there may still not be any conflict because they may not have higher goals in terms of power, or at least not pursue them.

Caste societies have been based on such mechanisms. Both vertical <sup>caste</sup> caste systems (like the Indian brahmanic system) and more horizontal caste systems like the structure for accommodating Jews in certain European societies have been, at times - with Jews handling abstract symbols, science, and concrete money, banking; - both high but not with ultimate power over the handling of symbols and money. Clearly, as both examples indicate, these are by no means stable solutions but may even lead to the most cruel overt (direct, through action) or indirect (through the operation of structures) conflict. Not only demographic balance, but also a socially rather static condition seem necessary. The niches must not change relative position, the ambitions must remain constant.

And yet, even under such conditions conflict may arise and not only because of any misperception. The fact remains that ethnic groups are different, racial groups even visible so (so far audible, olfactory, tactile characteristics have not been used in defining races). What is different may be attractive, but it may also be repulsive, even threatening. What is repulsive and/or threatening may lead to a desire for distance, that very desire, when enacted, may lead to conflict. Prejudice is an attitude, negative prejudice a negative attitude - only when it is enacted as negative behavior - usually referred to as "social distance", even as "discrimination" - will it be perceived by the other side and, possibly, lead to conflict.

Why should differences lead to such consequences? I think the answer must be found in the tension, even dialectic, between difference and similarity. A mineral, a plant, an animal, a monkey are all more "different" from <sup>us</sup> than a member of any other ethnic group, yet does not lead to diffuse feelings of being threatened. I think the point is, rather, something like this: Let us say we make a list of characteristics of human beings, <sup>that</sup> we are able to identify one hundred, and we divide them into changeable (delible) and unchangeable (indelible). A finds another person B in his neighborhood and they are similar in most regards except for some very few <sup>ethnic</sup> characteristics that it is <sup>his</sup> B's power to change, yet he does not change them. Clearly this



is threatening: "he could become one like us, yet he prefers not to do so - that means he rejects us and what is ours." It should be noted that the feeling of threat may be stronger the higher the similarity: the more does the difference stand out. But then imagine ~~if~~ he cannot change the remaining characteristics: they are race, gender, age. Again it is threatening: "we are basically dissimilar and yet we are similar: that means that my race, gender, age are not so important as I think they are - I may have to give them up as something to be proud of -". This is the threat to identity experienced today by whites relative to non-whites, by men relative to ~~to~~ women, by the middle-aged relative to the young (and later on it will also be relative to the old).

Imagine then that A finds another person C in his neighborhood, dissimilar on a high number of characteristics. Interestingly, the threat may be considerably less if among these characteristics are also a number of unchangeable ones. A may find in C a confirmation of his most cherished beliefs, i.e. that these unchangeable characteristics determine the others: there is order in the universe. But imagine C has the unchangeable ones in common with A: only the changeable ones are different. Well, that shows that there is high and low in society, in and by itself not threatening. The threat comes the moment C is "lower" on the unchangeable ones (what sociologists call "ascribed" characteristics), yet higher on the changeable ones (the achieved dimensions). This situation is referred to as rank incongruence, and is probably the situation most loaded with conflict.

And that brings us to the crucial question: what determines the "rank" of a racial or ethnic group, let us call them "RE groups" to be able to deal with both at the same time. Before any attempt at answering the question let it only be noted how limited our conceptualization of RE conflict actually is, shaped as it is by two paradigms:

(1) A new RE group conquers the territory of the "natives" and turns them into their servants/servants/slaves - the possible dravidian origin of low caste in India, the Berbers in North Africa, the Amerindians in the Americas,

etc. As a special case these groups may become marginalized rather than exploited, such as the Samie in the Nordic countries.

(2) An RE group lets another RE group immigrate - against its own will (slavery) or with its own will (migrant labour) - the African slaves brought to the Americas, in the arch from Rio de Janeiro to Washington DC; "guest" workers in most more developed countries (MDCs) or temporarily rich countries (OPEC, for instance) today.

In either case there is a basic congruence between the ranking of the RE groups inside the country and the ranking of their points of origin on a scale of nations basically decided by the dominant RE group, as in terms of the criteria of liberal thinking based on economic growth (simply GNP/capita) or the marxist criterion of Stufe in the Stufenschema, whereby capitalist is higher than feudal but lower than socialist, etc. However, in both cases there is probably also a criterion of seniority: it is not enough for the nation to be rich, it ought to have been rich already for some time, not just one of the nouveaux riches - and the same may apply to socialist countries, they should have been so for some time. (a) socialist newspapers are made to encourage in the Soviet Union. Then, it has to be added that as the First world liberal/capitalist countries, among other reasons because of seniority as "modern", rank above the Second world marxist/socialist countries the liberal ranking in terms of GNP/capita ranks above the socialist ranking, or at least so one may assume.

Concretely this means that the total situation of an immigrant, ethnically different, group in a country such as Sweden and Norway may now be subject to change in two quite different ways:

(1) the group may be able to conquer, or be given access to, ever higher **niches in the** social structure - in terms of power and such correlates of power as high status jobs, income, education that after some time the validity of ethnic status as a predictor of general social status is heavily diminished.

(2) The nation from which the group comes improves considerably its status in the world society and this cannot fail to have an impact on the position

of the group in the host society: an example being the position of the Japanese-Americans in contemporary US, particularly Hawaii (where they are almost one third of the population, whereas the position of the Chinese is more ambiguous.

(China is modernizing, yet not rich, powerful, but socialist which does not count positively (but not necessarily negatively either) in the US; the Chinese are not white, but they are not very colored either: what does all that add up to?

With these additional factors the approach to ethnic conflict starts becoming more complex, in other words at least potentially more realistic. And it can be made <sup>still</sup> more complex. For countries one may also make a distinction between ascribed and achieved, between what is seen as nature-given and unchangeable for ~~this~~ or ~~that~~ reason (location in the world geography, endowment ~~with~~ natural resources) and <sup>as</sup> achieved dimensions (GDP/capita, education and health levels attained, etc.) And one may repeat the thinking above and even expand it. Imagine a country has achieved more than should be predicted from its ascribed status: is it then not to be expected that this would lead to a certain self-assertiveness, even aggressiveness? And if it is an underachiever, would that not lead to a certain collective feeling of being behind, or lagging, as opposed to the other one which is obviously leading? Would that not lead to a certain feeling of guilt or shame as case may be - as often found in Mediterranean countries in Europe; (whereas the African Mediterranean countries tend to see themselves as over-achievers as African countries and as under-achievers as Mediterranean countries, and hence get very ambivalent self-images.

There is an important linkage point between a country's search for status, for a position in world society and the corresponding efforts by an individual from that country in a host society: the more similar the rank profiles the more will the individual identify with his country of origin. More particularly, if they are both over-achievers the individual will tend to retain his ethnic characteristics and be self-assertive. If they are both underachievers he will also accept his ethnicity but in a non-assertive.

non-aggressive way, somehow accepting a low station in life. Then, if he is an over-achiever and the country an under-achiever the hypothesis would be that he might tend to be ashamed of his country of origin and sever the ties, meaning shedding his ethnicity. Why should he keep it, he is doing so much better! - whether he explains that in terms of own superiority or the superiority of the host country relative to his country of origin or (more advanced form of thinking, less frequent), both. And finally, he could be an underachiever and the country an overachiever, in which case he might have a feeling of shame/guilt and no real identification in a positive sense but a pretended identification, trying to invoke his country's achievements when his own fail to convince himself and/or others. Incidentally, the role of sports as an indicator of a country's standing should not be underestimated here: the New International Football Order - to mention but one, hoists a lot of Third world and Mediterranean countries into prominence, perhaps particularly in the layers of the population where inter-ethnic contact may be most intense, in the working class.

In other words, the hypotheses can be summarized as follows:

		Country	
		under-achiever	over-achiever
Individual	under-achiever	Identity, non-assertive	Precluded Identity
	over-achiever	Denied Identity	Identity, assertive

It should only be added that the dynamic perspective here is even more important: the point is perhaps not so much whether a country is an overachiever as whether it is tending in that direction, and so on. Once settled as an overachiever that itself becomes almost an ascribed characteristic and individuals from that country as well as everybody else may become so used to the situation that some of the social-psychological effect tapers off. Thus, it is change rather than absolute position that counts, and relative change rather than the change in any one of these variables.

An immigration policy has to include some vision as to the goal, or at least of the direction in which the country is moving. In real life politics the goals will never be so clear-cut as in the survey just presented, nor will the goals be so explicit. The national calculus, implicit or explicit, may run something like this:

(1) whether for humanitarian reasons (refugees, etc.) or for utilitarian reasons (to get labor who will do the tasks our labor force will not do because the work is too heavy/dirty/degrading/boring) or cannot do because it is too complex/advanced) or then again for humanitarian reasons (to unite families) migration will take place. Even if the world as a whole is not a community of nations there are such communities (like the EC, the Nordic countries) or semi-communities (like the British Commonwealth) where migration will take place.

(2) one may try everything to make the stay transitory (till refugees can return, till there is no longer demand for that type of labor) or encourage unification of families elsewhere, persuading the immigrants through promises at the time of immigration, bargaining with them by literally easing them to leave, eventually forcing them out of the country. But promises will be broken or may become meaningless when new situations arise: money may be insufficient for people, who already feel rooted, to move; there will be limits to the use of force unless national security can be said to be at stake.

(3) so some, even many, migrants will stay. The choice is then between vertical and horizontal models, and which ones, or which mix. Any caste model will be difficult to maintain in a society which is not already a caste society or a semi-caste society, like the US, for instance. The more homogeneous the country, the more difficult to deny all immigrants citizenship just because they are ethnically/racially different. Consequently, the vision of the future is likely to be a class society with migrants who enter at the bottom drifting up, and those who enter at the top (the very qualified) gradually trickling down till they distribute more evenly, after some time.

(4) The question, then, is what kind of long term horizontal model can be envisaged. The singularist, dominance model is, of course, a vertical model in disguise, not only attractive but also "natural" in a situation where the migrants are few and divided, entering over a long period and drifting upward over a long period - in a homogeneous, stable society. Conformity to dominant usage becomes the obvious norm. But if these conditions do not obtain, then the other models should come into play. The "melting pot" model, however, can probably be disregarded for ethnical groups: racial groups can combine to produce individuals that look "in-between", that are mixes, because genetic codes can be combined more easily, it seems, than ethnic codes. Or, more precisely: there is something holistic, integrated in a language, and in a religion, that makes it very difficult to produce in-betweens. They may be combined as when a person combines Christianity and buddhism (not so difficult) or Christianite and Islam (almost impossible), or is bilingual - but that is not an in-between. Genetically a person may be said to have this characteristic from the mother and that from the father, and so on, but there are so many, ~~also~~ <sup>almost</sup> countless, characteristics of the appearance of a person that one nevertheless can talk about mixes. The combination of physiognomy, skin, hair and eye-color that make up a race does not constitute an integrated, unbreakable whole - it is possible to break into it, take some elements from the father and some from the mother in a way one cannot do with the father's religion and the mother's religion.

What remains, then, are the two pluralist possibilities, federated and integrated. The federal one is in reality a horizontal caste system: it presupposes that EK groups ought to remain separate, yet would like to try to make them equal in rights and duties, in power and privilege. I think the same point can be made as in connection with caste: this will only work if there is some tradition of that type in the country, and/or if groups are more equal in size and claims. A trickle of immigrants, well below, say, 10%, in an otherwise homogeneous population does not constitute a basis for a dramatic structural transformation of federal type. Hence we are left with the integrated case, and with the dominant model. The rest of the paper is about this.

Let us first have a look at the reasons why it is highly unlikely that the migrants will leave. I would not base that merely on the individual/family migrant cost-benefit analysis of staying vs going "home" as the situation appears right now. Rather, I think one would need to look at the whole situation from a more generic viewpoint.

The first level of analysis could be the individual migrant's own social mobility perspective. Let us assume s/he has a dim perspective on this, and realistically so. Let us assume s/he has <sup>only</sup> a good accumulation of sufficient money to invest in means of consumption back home (decorating the old farm house, securing retirement), or even in means of production or distribution, some little factories, some shops, what not. He may be encouraged by the host country in doing so. But that means that his offering will necessarily follow something back home? Or, could it be that they have adopted as their scale/radder of social mobility, the host country - that the idea of creating a niche back home is abandoned? Of course, that depends on their age: pre-school or early school children will be transported home with the rest of the belongings; young adult children who have tried and failed may easily join back to an old country to which they may have a rather abstract relationship. But those in-between, say from puberty, 12, till their mid-twenties, may compare their chances here and there. *Their returns may be in the host country.*

And they may also be part of the parental strategies for family survival through the career of the children in a host country held to be seen through determined use of education. What then happens is well known: some immigrant children study and work extremely hard, being on the average as able as any other group, spurred on by the knowledge that they work not only for themselves but for the family, the clan, the nation, unimpeded by too many obligations because the surrounding society is at least to some extent closed to them. They get into the professions where the labour market may be more easy. May be - this presupposes that a young person in a migrant family is able to make a colossal jump: from the bottom niche where his parents could enter because the jobs were <sup>unfilled</sup> wanted by host country nationals, to the upper

niches where he can enter because there are not enough capable host country nationals. Translator would be one such possibility, anything drawing on his/her ethnicity. But this evidently <sup>is</sup> both limited and highly competitive. Historically the military professions have offered another such opening -- the latter part of the (Western) Roman Empire is filled with such stories. Physicians, dentists, engineers, informatics -- new fields not yet quite discovered by the host country -- but then, how could migrants get <sup>the</sup> training?

In short, this will be for the few. However, there are still two other possibilities, often not thought of by politicians, social scientists and others that still may tip the balance in favor of staying rather than going "back"

One is the possible mobility not so much of any individual (and thereby the family) as of the niche of occupations in which he is located. And that leads straight to the old standard question in sociology of what determines the social standing of an occupation or a niche (meaning a set of occupations in this context). Prestige is related to power and privilege, power is built into the job so to speak, and privilege usually accrues to the powerful but what decides how much power the holders of a occupation have? The job may imply command over others (physician, bureaucrat, shop-keeper); the society may ask for some legitimation of such power and find answers in the level of education (or vice versa: because physicians have power over others they have <sup>to</sup> pay for this with a very lengthy education). However, as mentioned above, only few of the migrants will make it this way.

However, there are two other keys to the question of what determines the position of an occupation: indispensability of the occupation and insubstitutability of the holder of that occupation. The prestige may not be high, even quite low as seen in any caste system, but if the job performance is indispensable and the job-performers are the only ones who can perform then they are at least secure. The migrant will feel threatened if (a) the job can be eliminated through automation and/or (b) others, e.g. host country nationals, are willing/able to do the job. Any change in this picture will affect the cost-benefit calculus. And chances are that many jobs, e.g. dealing with



waste disposal from industry, house-holds, hospitals will not/cannot be automated and that the migrants will not be outcompeted.

The second is the possible mobility not of the individual, family, occupation or niche but of the nation from which the migrants come. This has been hinted at above as a major factor. The mobility that would be of interest

would be relative: the country of origin may be on the way up and at the same time the host country on the way down. An example may be the Japanese migrants to Hawaii and the US West coast - evidently with low status till relatively recently, now on the way up, with their country of origin.

However, there is a condition: that the migrants manage to be seen as representative, not just as some strange, marginal group. The rituals have to be well performed, they have to have well publicized travels back home and be accepted as "forward based" nationals: they have to be well treated when

there is a dignitary visit from country of origin to host country. The national prestige in the international system has to be transferred and transformed into personal prestige in the inter-personal system. And even so it

may take time because of the "waiting room" principle for nations and individuals. The nouveau riche may think he has made it and be disappointed: the

system needs time to get used to new distribution of riches, that also applies

to nations. Japanese are accepted, they have been in the "waiting room" long enough: equally rich and educated Koreans not, because Korea has not been in

the waiting room long enough: equally rich and educated Singaporeans or Hong Kong(ese) yes, not because of the (recent) status of these two island

city-states, but because of the high position of the Chinese nation as such.

This last factor is important because a number of changes are to be expected in the ranking of nations given the very dynamic situation in

which the global system is right now. The general formula would be something

like this: the North-Western corner of the world, and of Europe (with North America) in particular, cannot expect to retain the top <sup>world</sup> position: the only

direction from the top being downward. By implication those at the bottom can expect to rise: they will not remain that low. That applies to the South Eastern corner of the world (Japan etc.) and of Europe, from where many of

the immigrants come (Yugoslavs- Greeks- Turks). It may be objected that they are not likely in one generation to attain the material level, on the average, of such typical host countries as Sweden - but that is besides the point. Rather, the idea is that the identification of the immigrant with his or her own ethnicity will increase. That may not change the decision to stay on, but the stay, if that is the decision, will be pursued with more assertiveness, more pride, less willingness to be content with status quo at the bottom of society. "I am proud of my country" will be heard more often, stated with more conviction, with the expectation that the resistance on the way up may decrease.

An example here may be Iran. Even staunch opponents of the shah regime felt in those days that Iran was something, had some kind of position - maybe precisely by virtue of being the "most reliable US ally" in that region, to the point of having a mission that of lording it over other countries in that part of the world. Came the Khomeini revolution and it all changed. Regardless of what position the Iranian immigrant might have relative to that revolt - clearly Iran's position in the "first world" suffered a dramatic decline. And Iranian (student) immigrants not only suffered because they were cut off from financial support, and because of a more deeply rooted hostility to Khomeini than to the shah (after all, anti-Islam'ism is much older in Western society than the fairly recent anti-communism), but because Iran had suffered that decline. Needless to say, decline is a much quicker process than the laborious climb up any prestige ladder.

It has been mentioned above that this is not merely a question of rise of the country of origin, but also of possible decline of the host country. One indicator of the latter would be the share in the world export market, particularly for sophisticated industrial products. When for a country like Sweden that share dropped from 7% to 3% during the period 1961 to 1975, a decline hardly reversible, then this does not pass unnoticed in the world. The country makes itself less felt. It may still possess ideological power and coercive power through its military, but the latter is naked and brute if the former is not considered very relevant, and the country is supplying ever

less of the goods and services of the world. I would expect this process by and large to continue. The status loss, or atimia of the Western world will not be a linear process. There will be ups and downs, even sharp rises due to sudden military exploits, for instance (such as the Falkland/Malvinas) but the general trend will be as described. Hence, even small increases in the prestige of the country of origin would lead to increases in assertiveness and in the desire to stay and try to improve one's status - unless the decrease of the host country is so dramatic that the migrants simply prefer to leave.

In a sense this is the old story of whether you do or whether you don't, you are damned either way. If a government would like to decrease the number of immigrants it may feel that a relative decrease in status would help. Probably not; it may encourage assertive identity. So, what about an economic boom in the host country, a new rise? Not at all, that will open for jobs for the immigrants and make them want to stay to have a share in the newly generated riches, also generated by their staying that means, but with a less assertive identity. Any dualism, hence, would seem attractive, possibly implying that a non-dynamic host country is one that might be vacated more quickly. But what is the chance of a non-dynamic situation in such a highly dynamic world?

Thus, having arrived at the conclusion that most or at least many immigrants are there to stay (as indeed is the historical experience, unless evicted by force), I return to the problem of whether the dominant or integrated model will prevail. In a sense the answer is implicitly already given: it depends on the circumstances of the immigration and the intra-migration, the mobility inside the society that follows it. The dominant or conformity model is that of slow immi- and intra-migration processes, learning the language and all the other mores of the host country, attaining citizenship, gradually shedding one's original identity, taking on that of the host country, becoming one of "them". This, of course, is easiest if there is no racial distinction that may serve as a marker at the same time. It is also the approach most likely to lead to conflict avoidance provided there is suffi-

cient synchrony in the process, the immigrant getting citizenship <sup>neither</sup> so early that the environment feels he may not have conformed enough, or so <sup>late</sup> that he himself feels he has conformed in vain. Hence, the interesting point to be made or to be explored would be why this process is less likely, and that brings in most of the factors so far made use of in this paper.

Conformity is a sign of submission, a price seen as a minimum price to pay for the permission to stay, to be left relatively unmolested physically, even psychologically.

The integrated mode of ethnic co-existence would be one of non-conformity, in a sense announcing: "we are going to ask for a better bargain now, giving in less, giving up less of what we are,

<sup>Want</sup> <sup>more</sup> because we are offering more: we are better educated, able to perform higher up in your society. And even if we stay with our low, menial jobs we know that you cannot do without those jobs being performed, and nobody else wants to do that: regardless of your unemployment the jobs would remain vacant if we did not fill them. Moreover, you are not that rich or important any longer, and the country we come from is not to be bullied around any more. <sup>The</sup> old days are gone and forever. Given that we were part of the condition for your rapid economic growth when you had a severe labor deficit you simply owe it to us to recognize that the situation has changed, that there are very good cards on our hands, the best one, of course, being that <sup>many</sup>/<sup>most</sup> of us have your citizenship already".

So, what are the demands going to be? One class of demands will be in the category of proportionality: for any social groupings the proportion of the migrant group should be roughly that of the proportion they have in the population. Invariably this means that the migrant groups get into positions of power. <sup>The</sup> "indigenous" may accept immigrant physicians, but what about immigrant cabinet ministers? prime ministers? (Kings?) And what about non-indigenous in clearly representative roles abroad such as ambassadors?

Both superpowers have had to come to grips with this <sup>have</sup> and accept the atypical as heads of the countries - a Georgian for Russians, a Catholic for ~~the~~ Americans. <sup>Other</sup> countries will have to come to grips with the same, each

visible or invisible border crossing will have to be fought, in court, in the streets, intellectually, emotionally in all spheres, etc.

However, this is a well-defined battle: it is relatively clear what it is all about. There are models, and two such models are known even inside the most homogeneous societies: equality of opportunity, proportionality for those of low class/caste origin (at least in school), and proportionality for women.

but then there is this second type of demand, not distributive equality for individual members of the immigrant nation, but equality for the immigrant nation as such. I am not discussing the idea that the immigrant nation in some cases may even like to be on top, imposing its ethnicity as the norm of the country. That case is known as conquest, quick or slow, and is outside the scope of the present paper.

Rather, the point would be that the immigrant nation wants equality with the host nation, nothing less; ~~in~~ other words, she demands for a change of the country from uni-national to multi-national. Of course, this demand may also come from a dominated "host" nation against dominant immigrants, as in the case of Arabs relative to Jews in various parts of Israel, potentially even in Israel as a whole - Again, this is nothing that exceptional in the world. Disregarding federated countries like Switzerland there are multi-lingual and/or multi-religious countries such as Malaysia, and even cities such as Miami, Florida - although some animals <sup>always</sup> tend to be some equal than others.

Actually, many models can now be imagined. The example of Malaysia is interesting: in principle three parallel societies within the country's borders - Malay/Muslim, Chinese/Buddhist-Confucian and Tamil/Hindu respectively - have the English as a lingua franca in the upper ranges of society. Of course, the model is not stable, the linguistic minorities have to give <sup>to</sup> the majority, learning the bahasa (Malaysian), not vice versa (without parallel religious requirements, though). It may actually be disputed whether this is really one society and not three parallel ones, a question which may also be put for Switzerland which can be seen as a much penetrated by the world

those with a vested interest in the myth: federal authorities in Bern and some business circles. Of course myths are real to the extent they are believed in.

But there are more interesting models. Thus, one could imagine immigrants who not only refuse to give up their own ethnic idiom (which means more than merely linguistic competence) but also refuse to learn that of the host nation. That will not make them loved, and they will generally only be tolerated if they can be pushed into marginal niches (in space, social space and/or time (meaning granted short periods of stay only)) -- as argued more places above. But, imagine this is impossible, as is the assumption in this section. In that case this tough stance may also be the opening gambit in a strategy the goal of which is to attain a multi-national society, not a parallel nations society.

And that brings us straight to the important point: in a truly integrated, horizontal society not only will minorities speak majority, or generally "host" language; the majority will also speak minority languages. A very concrete example of what this means, in an embryonic stage, is available in many countries today, but nowhere so clearly as in Sweden: the instructions in quite un-Swedish languages such as Serbo-croat, Turkish, even Urdu. The Swedish dominant majority communicates in all minority languages:

they do not assume knowledge of their own. This, however, certainly does not imply any horizontality: the racist regime in South Africa also communicates in African languages, and the theocratic regime in Israel in Arabic. It is quite a distance from this to some linguistic competence on the side of the majority.

... talking and listening, if not also writing and reading -- or at least the passive modes (listening and reading) if not also the active mode. Or at the very least: some elementary "tourist" type knowledge of minority languages, beyond orders, warnings, prohibitions and prohibitions in general.

So, what is envisaged would be a country where most people talk the language of the other ethnic groups -- up to a point both in quantity of languages and

quality of competence. In the beginning this will take the form of the majority picking up some phrases, using them in a smiling, often condescending way. Later on real communication will take place, and such patterns as found today in Switzerland and Canada, as with everyone talking his/her own language assuming passive competence in the listeners, or switching from one language to the other, assuming symmetry, will emerge.

Today one can actually sense some of this emerging with WASP Americans picking up, clumsily, some Japanese in conversations with Japanese-Americans in Hawaii, stimulated, no doubt, by the highly visible presence of all kinds of signs in Japanese - but for tourists, not for immigrant workers, for instance.

Will this happen in countries like Sweden? It all depends on the parameter defining the relative power: the position of the immigrants relative to the "natives", of the country of origin relative to the host country, etc. Under certain conditions indicated above immigrants will use their power potential. But will the local population take up the challenge? This, of course, depends very much on governmental policy, and here some points can be made.

First, the presence of other nations has to be seen as something positive, enriching the country, essentially also enriching the host nation. This can only happen when policy changes in a very basic way: from "tolerating differences" to "enjoying differences". That enjoyment has to be based on some element of curiosity about other nations, and that curiosity is profoundly human: it exists and does not have to be created in any artificial way. I shall never forget what I once experienced in Malaysia: a Malay wondering what the little color spot on the forehead used by many Hindu women, in different colors, possibly could mean. I asked the person why he didn't solve the problem simply by asking some Hindu woman, and the answer was as immediate as it was sad and obvious: "partly because I do not really know any, and partly because it is so painful to ask: we have lived together for generations so I feel I should know".

Second, the task of seeing differences as enjoyable cannot be solved by lessons in school. Governmental pamphlets about "our friends, the immigrants" or better, some description for everybody of major characteristics of all groups living in the country (such as national days, religious days, major characteristics of faith and language, etc.). These are both fine, but in addition there has to be something in action, not only in print or otherwise in words. Mixed couples have to give their testimony of how they co-exist, what they find negative and what positive in the mentality of the other, etc. There has to be public celebration of the week calendar points not only of the host, but also of the immigrant nations. And there has to be some language policy corresponding to this.

As this is an important point something might perhaps be added. There are many elements, or even stages here. First, the immigrant child learns the host language, not spoken at home, and comes out with two disadvantages: low competence in "own" language (e.g., only oral) without sufficient compensation in terms of host language competence (e.g., only written). Second, he receives instruction in the language of his parents. Third, an important step forward: he receives instruction also in other subjects, in his parent language. This may or may not make him perfectly bilingual, but a guess would be that judged on a world scale he now belongs to a world upper class in terms of inter-ethnic competence. And the nationals of the host nation do not: they remain uni-ethnic, not poly-ethnic. They may argue, without saying it out loud, that "this is still the country of that single language and they, not I have to conform" - and "my language is more important than theirs". But these are precisely the assumptions to be challenged by changing circumstances - e.g. when every eighth Swede is first or second generation foreigner (already the case) and all kinds of immigrants cooperate politically rather than accepting the fragmentation in national groups (not yet the case).

Hence, the argument would be that the unavoidable (provided one is not going to evict forcibly all immigrants) should rather be turned into something positive. It should not be so difficult under the heading of teaching of the



national language to include teaching of the languages of the other nations in the country. Particularly when these languages are different, even with different characters, this should open a unique opportunity to see one's own language from the outside, so to speak. It may be objected that there would be no teachers available with any knowledge of Serbo-croat grammar, or even words, leaving alone Turkish, nor anyone able to draw a single Arabic character. However, in districts where there are many corresponding immigrants there should always be somebody who could teach, say, twelve hours about his/her own language - and those are precisely the districts where this would be most needed.

Hence, I see for my own inner eye tables with nationalities on top as headings (including host nation) and then all kinds of information on national history, culture, religion and language vertically - for comparison, for parallel study. I do not think the extra one or two weeks training course teachers needed to handle this would be too difficult to arrange. And when carried into practise it would greatly contribute to more open windows towards the world, teaching people to see their own nation as one out of several.

And that brings me to the final point. All these issues point beyond the more immediate, and itself highly significant problem: that of accommodating immigrants without too much frustration and conflict. What has been said above has perspectives further ahead, into the future, tying up with the points made in the beginning. Thus, with the tremendous increase in inter-national interaction the old uni-national, singularist nation state is simply no longer viable. Hence, much better see the handwriting on the wall: Pluralism, multi-national countries and states are coming. But they cannot be that vertical any longer: that could only work when the nations as such were organized, e.g. by colonialism, in very steep vertical orders, reflected inside societies. The slave or oppressed workers inside corresponded to a colonial people outside. That world system is no longer there. In the United Nations only some persons from the old colonial powers can still afford to be in command of only one language - that of their own country. United Nations

is Polyethnic also inside many persons/diplomats/staff. A modern Eurocentric country will eventually have to become a United Peoples, and not only a United individuals. It will take time, but it will come in one way or the other, the classical nation-state being too artificial in an ever shrinking world.